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PART II 
Private Law 
CHAPTER 2 
Torts 
PETER A. DONOVAN 
A. CouRT DEciSIONs 
§2.1. Products liability: Wrongful death actions: Privity of con-
tract. A most unusual wrongful death action, containing both negli· 
gence and warranty liability claims, came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court for decision during the 1970 SURVEY year. In Necktas v. General 
Motors Corp.,! the Court again refused to abo:ish the privity doctrine 
in warranty actions.2 Two Justices dissented, however, indicating their 
displeasure with the privity rule and their willingness to overrule it.3 
Fifteen days after the plaintiff purchased a new 1963 Pontiac, her 
son was killed while driving the automobile when it suddenly veered 
to the left, crossing the median strip of a divided highway, and col-
lided with an oncoming vehicle. An examination of the vehicle, made 
approximately one hour later by a research mechanic working at Har· 
vard Medical School, Department of Legal Medicine, revealed a mal-
functioning power steering unit, which was not itself damaged in the 
collision. From the time of the purchase until the date of the accident, 
no repairs had been made on the car, which had been driven only 500 
miles. 
At the trial, the research mechanic testified to the following facts. 
First, the pulley of the power steering unit, which normally should 
turn freely, was frozen and could not be moved with a Stillson wrench. 
Second, the oil reservoir of the unit was empty and an odor of sulphur 
PETER A. DoNOVAN is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, Director 
of the Environmental Law Center and Editor of the Environmental Affairs Journal. 
§2.1. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 259 N.E.2d 234. 
2 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.1. 
31970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 846-852, 259 N.E.2d 234, 236-239. Spiegel, J., dissenting 
in an opinion joined by Kirk, J. 
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emanated from it. If there were no oil at all in the reservoir or if the 
fluid level were low, a clattering noise would be heard by anyone in 
the vehicle. Third, a failure of the power steering unit should not have 
interfered with the manual or ordinary steering mechanism of the car 
and should have permitted the driver to change to manual steering 
operation. This testimony constituted the only evidence in the record 
concerning the failure of the power steering mechanism. Additional 
evidence did indicate, however, that there were no tire or skid marks 
on the southbound lane of the divided highway prior to the point 
where the plaintiff's car veered across the median strip. There were tire 
marks on the northbound lane for approximately 45 feet, from the 
point where the plaintiff's vehicle left the median strip to the point of 
the collision. Additional evidence indicated that the plaintiff's son did 
not smoke cigarettes or drink alcoholic beverages,4 and thus was "an 
abstemious young man in possession of all his faculties."5 
The plaintiff sued both the manufacturer of the automobile and the 
dealer from whom she purchased it to recover damages for the death of 
her son and for the damage to her automobile. Verdicts were returned 
in favor of the plaintiff on multiple counts, containing both negligence 
and warranty theories. The case came to the Supreme Judicial Court 
on exceptions of both defendants claiming that they were entitled to 
directed verdicts. 
A majority of the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Rear-
don, sustained the exceptions on all counts except the warranty claim 
against the dealer for property damage. According to the majority, the 
evidence summarized above would permit the jury to infer that the car 
had a defective power steering unit when purchased, and that this 
constituted a breach of warranty. The Court ruled, however, that the 
defendants were entitled to directed verdicts on all other counts. First, 
the evidence did not establish negligence on the part of either defen-
dant; second, the warranty action brought against the manufacturer 
for property damages was deficient because of the absence of privity of 
contract between the plaintiff and the manufacturer; and third, the 
verdict recovered on the warranty-death count brought against the 
dealer had to be set aside because under G.L., c. 229, §2 (the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death statute), "recovery for death is purely statu-
tory and is based either upon negligence or upon a wilful, wanton or 
reckless act causing death."6 
Justice Spiegel, joined by Justice Kirk, dissented, indicating that the 
exceptions to the warranty count against the manufacturer for prop-
erty damage and the negligence count against each defendant for 
wrongful death should have been overruled. 
The dissenting Justices agreed with the majority's conclusion that 
4 ld. at 844, 259 N.E.2d at 235. 
5 Id. at 847, 259 N.E.2d at 2!17, Spiegel, J., dissenting. 
6 Id. at 845, 259 N.E.2d at 236. 
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it was proper for the jury to infer that the car had a defective power 
steering unit when it was purchased from the dealer, and that this con-
stituted a breach of warranty. They also agreed with the majority's 
apparent conclusion that the jury had properly found that the power 
steering unit was the proximate cause of the accident. This conclusion, 
they reasoned, necessarily required dismissal of the exceptions to the 
negligence count: 
... [We] find it extremely difficult to maintain that a jury can 
infer causation from the fact that there was no fluid in the power 
steering unit reservoir and yet hold that the same jury would not 
be warranted in inferring that the absence of fluid in the reservoir 
was evidence of negligence, either in the constructing, assembling 
or inspecting of the power steering mechanism. It seems obvious 
that the power steering fluid did not just suddenly evaporate into 
thin air. [We] believe that the nature of the defect is such that it 
could logically be inferred that the defect existed prior to leaving 
the factory or dealership, or both, and could have been discovered 
through reasonable inspection.7 
Although they concurred in sustaining the exceptions with respect 
to the warranty-death count against the dealer, the dissenters expressed 
some displeasure with the wrongful death statute since it necessitates 
drawing distinctions between issues of "negligence" and "warranty." 
It is, at best, illogical and illusory to permit a person to recover 
damages for "injury to person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty" (G.L. c. 106, §2-715), and yet to deny 
recovery, except on the theory of "negligence" for death resulting 
from the same cause.s 
Finally, Justices Spiegel and Kirk concluded their dissent with an 
attack upon the Massachusetts privity rule. Because of the importance 
of this development, which constitutes the first breach- though ever 
so slight- in the privity citadel, and the limited extent to which the 
two Justices indicated they would depart from the doctrine, their rea-
soning deserves careful consideration. 
[We] think it necessary to comment on the question of "privity 
of contract" referred to in the opinion. [We] believe that in this 
modern era of corporate responsibility, a reliance on the technical 
doctrine of "privity of contract" as a curb to bar recovery in im-
plied warranty cases should be entombed just as we have recently 
done with the doctrine of charitable immunity. Such a holding 
would reflect the realities of the market place. It is common knowl-
edge that automobile manufacturers, as do manufacturers of a va-
7 Id. at 848, 259 N.E.2d at 237. 
8 Id. at 850, 259 N.E.2d at 239. 
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riety of other products, make direct "sales pitches" to the public 
through the media of mass communication. To fail to recognize 
that the warranties inherent in this type of mass advertising run 
directly from the manufacturer to the consumer is to ignore real-
ity. ' ' ' 
[We] would overrule the exceptions on the warranty count 
against the manufacturer [for property damage] and on the negli-
gence counts for "wrongful death" against both defendants.9 
It should be noted that this articulated rationale for that abolition 
of the privity doctrine in Massachusetts law is confined to the distribu-
tion of those products accompanied by "direct 'sales pitches' to the 
public through the media of mass communication."1° 
Perhaps the two Justices are unwilling to abolish the privity doc-
trine in its entirety as it relates to products liability litigation. Never-
theless, they have expressed willingness to abolish it in a class of cases 
involving products advertised through the public communications me-
dia. This constitutes a significant judicial development in Massachu-
setts, as the dissent's view would apply to the numerical majority of 
products liability cases should it eventually be shared by the other 
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§2.2. Privity of contract: Negligent misrepresentation. The de-
cision of the Supreme Judicial Court refusing to abolish the privity of 
contract doctrine in products liability warranty actions analyzed in 
Section 2.1 supra was not the only case involving privity decided by 
the Court during the 1970 SuRVEY year. The Court applied the doc-
trine to bar recovery in still another case involving a negligent mis-
representation. 
Until recently, recognition under Massachusetts law of a cause of 
action in tort for negligent misrepresentation was restricted to cases 
where contractual privity existed between the parties.1 In 1966, how-
ever, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Craig v. Everett M. Brooks 
Co.,2 permitting recovery in a negligent misrepresentation case where 
there existed no privity relationship between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. Craig involved an action in tort brought by a general con-
tractor against a civil engineer-surveyor for damages resulting from the 
defendant's negligent placement of offset stakes on a real estate devel-
oper's land. Both the plaintiff and defendant had contracted with the 
developer, and the defendant knew his stakes were to be used to guide 
the plaintiff in the construction of roads on the land. Although no 
9 Id. at 850-852, 259 N.E.2d at 239. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966). 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 851, 259 N.E.2d 234, 239. 
§2.2. 1 See, e.g., Blank v. Kaitz, 350 Mass. 779, 216 N.E.2d 110 (1966), where the 
directors of a corporation who relied upon reports negligently prepared by ac-
countants were unable to recover for lack of privity. 
2 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 7.?2 (1967). 
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contractual relationship existed between the contractor and the sur-· 
veyor, the Court permitted recovery, saying: 
... The requirement of a contractual relation for recovery for 
injury to the person due to negligent performance of a contractual 
duty was done away with in Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319-
Mass. 92. See United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 
135 (D.C.S.D. Cal.). In the case at bar where the defendant was 
under contract with the owner to perform professional services, 
where the plaintiff was under another contract with the owner 
which contemplated reliance on those services, where the identity 
of the only possible plaintiff and the extent of his reliance were 
known to the defendant, and where damages are not remote, it is 
reasonable to reach an analogous result. We are reluctant to per-
petuate a distinction which would be logically indefensible.3 
Since "[t]here would be no 'liability in an indeten;ninant amount for 
an indeterminant time to an indeterminant class,' " the Court over-
ruled a directed verdict for the defendant on the negligent misrepre-
sentation count.4 
Because most other jurisdictions have long ago abolished the privity 
doctrine in all negligence actions, Craig is a noteworthy decision only 
because it was decided in Massachusetts. It was introduced by the au-
thor of the Torts chapter in the 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY with the opti-
mistic and hopeful section heading, "Negligence: Farewell to privity." 
The author even went so far as to conclude in his summary that "[t]he 
decision should put an end, for all time, to any consideration of con-
tractual privity as the standard for determination of the defendant's 
duty in a negligence case."5 
Unfortunately, this prediction has not proved correct. It is now clear 
that old soldiers indeed do not die and, regretfully, it is not at all cer-
tain that they even fade away. During the 1970 SuRVEY year, the Su-
preme Judicial Court had occasion to re-examine the qualifying mod-
ifications set forth in the Craig opinion and decided to adhere to them. 
Anthony v. Vaughn6 was an action in tort for negligent misrepresen-
tation brought by the beneficiary named in a certificate of insurance 
3 Id. at 501, 222 N.E.2d at 755. 
4 Id. at 500, 222 N.E.2d at 755, quoting from Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven 
& Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). 
51967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4 at 39-40. 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 125, 255 N.E.2d 602. 
7 Neither the Court's opinion nor the briefs submitted by the parties make dear 
the date of issuance for the policy. On page 2 of the defendants' brief it is argued 
that the parties were "negotiating insurance" while on page 10 of the same brief 
it is argued that they were "reducing coverage." Since the Court's opinion states 
that the complaint alleged that the directors and officers of the association, "in 
reliance on the representation, voted for reduced coverage," it appears that a 
policy had been ismed and was simply being modified. (Emphasis supplied.) ld. at 
126, 255 N.E.2d at 603. 
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under a policy issued to the Boston Retail Liquor Dealers Association.7 
Upon the death of his father, the plaintiff became entitled to $3000, 
the proceeds of the policy which the insurance company refused to pay 
claiming the decedent was not covered. The facts of the controversy 
are critical to an understanding of the case and the Court's opinion. 
At a meeting of the association, the officers and directors voted unan-
imously to accept a reduction in the insurance coverage to $3000, the 
amount claimed by the plaintiff. The terms of the policy exempted all 
association members not actively at work on the day of the meeting. 
Since the plaintiff's father was not at work that day, he was not covered 
under the policy. The crux of the plaintiff's case was his daim that the 
insurance agent negligently and falsely stated at the meeting that, if 
a reduction was accepted, the policy would cover all members not ac-
tively at work on that day. Although the complaint alleged that the 
falsity of this statement was known or should have been known by the 
insurance company, and that the officers and directors of the associa-
tion (including the plaintiff) relied upon the statement in voting for 
the reduced coverage, the Court sustained the demurrers of both the 
insurance company and its agent. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff is suing as beneficiary upon a 
negligent representation made to the officers and directors of the 
association in order to influence their action. This case cannot be 
brought within the Craig case. To allow recovery would allow 
"liability in an indeterminant amount for an indeterminant time 
to an indeterminant class," an unfortunate result carefully avoided 
in the Craig case (p. 500). See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven 
& Co. [citation omitted]. If recovery were permitted, it would ex-
tend to an indefinite number of unidentified members of the asso-
ciation holding an unknown number of policies. An unknown 
number of the plaintiff's fellow beneficiaries would be included, 
embracing persons not present at the meeting at which the alleged 
misstatement was made.s 
The Court also found the complaint fatally defective in two other re-
spects. First, it was not alleged that the officers and directors knew that 
the plaintiff's father was a member of the association and was not ac-
tively at work on the date of the meeting, or that they intended him 
to be covered. Secondly, there was no allegation either that the plain-
tiff knew his father was not actively at work on that day or that he 
voted intending him to be covered. 
This decision defies explanation. The Anthony case did not involve 
liability in an indeterminant amount for an indeterminant time to an 
indeterminant class. All of these facts could easily be determined from 
the association's membership list. That list would reveal the identity 
and number of prospective insureds, the potential loss, and, if it did 
8 Id. at 126, 225 N.E.2d at 604. 
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not identify all the beneficiaries, it certainly would render their iden-
tification discoverable. Moreover, the time period would terminate 
either upon expiration of the contract or upon death of the last asso-
ciation member. 
The unfortunate result in Anthony is perhaps emphasized by the 
converse approach taken by the Court in Maxwell v. Ratcliffe.9 There 
the plaintiffs purchased a house relying upon the real estate broker's 
representations that the cellar was dry and that a playroom could be 
built in the cellar. An exception to a directed verdict for the defendant 
was sustained on the ground that the multiple listing which each bro-
ker possessed should have provided sufficient knowledge of the periodic 
water seepage which the cellar in fact suffered.10 It might then be 
asked why the Court in Maxwell held the defendant answerable for 
the facts he knew or should have known and failed to hold the insur-
ance company liable in Anthony under analogous circumstances. The 
only answer lies in the privity problem. 
Unfortunately, the multiplicity of claims which might result does 
not itself provide a substantial reason in law for permitting a fraudu-
lent inducement to contract. The time has long passed for the Court 
to re-examine the privity of contract doctrine and to offer sound rea-
sons for its retention if it is to remain a part of Massachusetts law. 
The reasons for its abolition have been summarized in previous SuR-
VEY volumes11 and need not be reiterated here. However, in view of 
the Supreme Judicial Court's stubborn adherence to this ancient and 
long-discredited relic of the common law, it seems wise to recall the 
comments of Justice Lummus in Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd.:12 
The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted general 
rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to 
produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the great weight 
of authority elsewhere. We now abandon it in this Common-
wealth.13 
The applicability of these comments to products liability warranty ac-
tions today is clear to all but a few. Once again, it is submitted that 
the time has come for the Supreme Judicial Court to recognize that 
the asserted "general" rule of privity of contract no longer exists. 
§2.3. Dramshop liability: Insurance coverage. During the 1968 
SuRvEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court decided on demurrer that a 
restaurant owner who negligently sells liquor to an intoxicated patron 
may incur liability to third-party occupants of a motor vehicle injured 
in a collision with the vehicle driven by the inebriated patron while 
91969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1475, 254 N.E.2d 250. 
10 Id. at 1477, 254 N.E.2d at 252. 
11 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.3; 1969 id. §l.l. 
12 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). 
13 Id. at 104, 64 N.E.2d at 700. 
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on his way home.l In another case decided the same year, the Court 
indicated that a liquor retailer may also incur liability to the auto-
mobile guest of the patron whom he permits to overindulge in his 
establishment.2 
The same accident involved in the first of these cases came before 
the Supreme Judicial Court again this year in a different setting when 
the restauranteur sought a declaratory judgment obligating his insurer 
to defend and pay any judgments which might be recovered in the 
pending tort actions brought against him. In Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoe-
nix Insurance Co,,3 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a final decree 
in favor of the restauranteur. 
The defendant insurance company had insured the plaintiff restau-
ranteur under a general liability policy for " 'all sums which the insured 
sha.J become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily in-
jury ... including death ... sustained by any person and caused by 
accident.' "4 The policy also obligated the insurer to "'defend any suit 
against the insured alleging such injury ... and seeking damages on 
account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.' "5 
As soon as the tort claimants commenced suit against the plaintiff in 
a prior action, the restauranteur immediately forwarded the writ and 
later the declaration to the insurer, which promptly disclaimed lia-
bility under an exclusion clause of the policy. Under the policy, the 
insured was not covered for 
... "liability imposed upon the insured or any indemnitee, as 
a person or organization engaged in the business of manufactur-
ing, selling or distributing alcoholic beverages, or as an owner. or 
lessor of premises used for such purposes, by reason of any statute 
or ordinance pertaining to the sale, gift, distribution or use of any 
alcoholic beverage ... " (emphasis added).6 
It was the insurer's contention that the plaintiff's liability existed 
under G.L., c. 138, §69, which forbids, inter alia, the sale of liquor to 
drunkards and intoxicated persons. Violation of this statute constitutes 
a crime and can result in revocation or suspension of license. The 
statute, however, grants no express right of action to pen.ons suffering 
damage due to its violation. Although such a provision originally con-
tained in the statute was repealed at the end of the Prohibition era, 
the Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless decided in Adamian v. Three 
§2.3. 1 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968), dis-
cussed in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.5, 3.14. 
2 Dimond v. Sacilotto, 353 Mass. 501, 233 N.E.2d 20 (1968), discussed in 1968 Ann. 
Surv. Mass, Law §§3.5, 3.14. 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 257 N.E.2d 774. 
4 Id. at 525, 257 N.E.2d at 775. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Id. at 525-526, 257 N.E.2d at 775. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/5
§2.3 TORTS 29 
Sons, Inc.7 that the statutory violation will support a private claim for 
compensation. 
Disputing the insurer's interpretation of. the policy provisions and 
the facts of the controversy, the restauranteur contended that the de-
fendant was obligated to defend the action because any liability on 
his part arose not by reason of the statute but out of common law 
negligence. After much correspondence and negotiation, the insurer 
agreed to defend, subject to a reservation of rights concerning its ob-
ligation to indemnify the plaintiff under the policy, but insisted upon 
full control of the defense. Its attorney filed an appearance for this 
purpose. The plaintiff was not entirely satisfied; he willingly agreed 
to defendant's full control of the suit but not to its reservation or non-
waiver of rights under the policy. Finally, the insurer's attorney with-
drew from the case because of the plaintiff's unwillingness to allow 
him full control of the defense while the insurer reserved its right to 
disclaim liability under the policy. This declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding then followed. 
Addressing itself first to the main defense, the Supreme Judicial 
Court found the insurance policy's exclusion clause unavailing be-
cause there was no "direct causal relationship" between the violation 
of the statute and the potential liability of the plaintiff . 
. . . To qualify for this exclusion, liability must directly result 
from the violation of a statute, in the sense that the violation, 
without more, is sufficient to impose liability. Nothing in G.L. c. 
I 38, §69, imposes civil liability. Indeed, this provision replaced the 
dramshop statutes, which did directly impose civil liability, when 
they were repealed [in 1933]. As we noted in the Adamian case, 
... a violation of c. 138, §69, may "be some evidence of ... negli-
gence as to all consequences the statute was intended to prevent." 
It is clear that the basis of Adamian's tort action is grounded in 
the common law doctrine of negligence and not on the violation 
of a statute.8 
The defendant's second defense was collateral to its first. It con-
tended that the plaintiff had breached its duty to cooperate by refusing 
to permit the defendant to defend and control the pending actions at 
the same time it reserved its rights to disclaim any liability under the 
policy. Defendant's position was predicated upon a previous decision 
which had resolved the dilemma facing the insurer by holding that the 
defense by an insurer of an action against an insured under a reserva-
tion of rights does not estop the insurer from subsequently disclaiming 
liability.9 • • , • • • 
The Court readily noted the d1fficulty of the msured s pos1t10n smce 
7 ~53 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968). · 
s 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 5?8,_ 257 N.E.2d 774, 776 (citations omitted). 
9 Sa1onen v. P~anenen, 320 Mass. 568, 71 N-.E.2ci 227 (1947)~ 
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his rights could be adversely affected when the insurer defends with 
complete control under a reservation of rights. This dilemma re-
mained unresolved.1o Although there is substantial authority in other 
jurisdictions to the effect that "an insurer who defends under a reser-
vation of rights and insists on retaining control of litigation is estopped 
later to deny liability,"11 the defense still argued that the insurer has 
a right to so control the conduct of the case subject to the risk that 
it later may be estopped to deny liability. This contention, the Court 
noted, amounts to a statement that "the defendant had a right to risk, 
by insisting on control of the litigation, a nullification of its purported 
reservation of rights."12 The argument was easily dismissed . 
. . . Such a rule does not commend itself to us and finds no sup-
port in our cases; nor, so far as we are aware, in those of other 
jurisdictions. If the reservation of rights is nullified in such cir-
cumstances, there is no necessity for the insurer to insist on it. The 
insurer gains only the right to control the conduct of the case, but 
nothing more if liability is found or a settlement reached. The 
statement of this proposition supplies its own answer.H 
The remaining defenses were also rejected. These included laches 
and contract illegality because (1) the policy sought to relieve a wrong-
doer of the consequences of his criminal conduct and (2) public policy 
prohibits a person from receiving insurance benefits covering tortious 
acts which are also violations of criminal statutes. The Court held that 
the defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that the plain-
tiff's delay had disadvantaged him, as is required for the application 
of the laches defense. The contract illegality defense was rejected not 
only because the defendant had failed to plead it but also because the 
contract, being an ordinary liability policy, was neither illegal in the 
making nor dependent on illegality for its performance. The Court 
refused to extend the doctrine of the life insurance cases denying re-
covery where the death of the insured resulted from suicide, murder by 
the beneficiary, or serious criminal conduct of the insured.14 Applica-
tion of that principle to the present case would mean that an insur-
ance company could avoid its obligation under its policy whenever 
an insured also violated a criminal statute. The Court held that pub-
lic policy would not be advanced by such an extension. 
§2.4. Liability of merchant to business invitees for injuries in-
10 This question was left open in the Salonen case, 320 Mass. 568, 71 N.E.2d 227 
(1947), and in Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 
(1964). 
11 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 529 n.1, 257 N.E.2d 774, 777 n.1, referring to cases: 
collected in the Magoun case, 346 Mass. 677, 683 n.5, 195 N.E.2d 514, 518 n.5 (1964) .. 
12 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 529, 257 N.E.2d 774, 777. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See DeMello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 281 Mass. 1910,. 19&-19.7, I&& 
N.E. 255, 256-257 (1932), and cases cited therein. 
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Dieted by other patrons. In past years, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has had several opportunities to consider and formulate the duties of 
a business establishment to protect its patrons from injury caused by 
the antisocial conduct of other customers. During the 1969 SuRvEY 
year, the Court required business proprietors to protect their customers 
from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of fellow customers, even 
from armed attacks by inebriated tavern patrons.! Another case of this 
genre reached the Court for decision during the 1970 SURVEY year. 
Marra v. Botta Corp.2 was an action of tort in three counts brought 
by several plaintiffs who were accosted and beaten by a group of youths 
as they left the defendant's bowling alley. The case came before the 
Supreme Judicial Court on exceptions taken from directed verdicts for 
the defendant. Viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiffs, the 
Court held that a jury could have found that the plaintiffs were ver-
bally insulted and physically molested by several boys while bowling 
in the defendant's establishment. 
Although aware of the abusive conduct of the youths, through per-
sonal observation and repeated complaints by members of the Marra 
party, the defendant's manager refused to summon police assistance, 
though twice requested to do so by the plaintiffs. The youths even-
tually departed the bowling alley armed with empty bottles and lin-
gered outside the establishment. When the plaintiffs left the bowling 
alley, they were attacked by the youths with bottles, and a general 
melee ensued, during which one of the plaintiffs fled to a drugstore and 
asked the proprietor to call the police. After three or four minutes, the 
fighting stopped when another plaintiff was rendered sightless by a 
bottle wielded by one of the youths; immediately thereafter, the police 
arrived on the scene. 
Citing prior decisions,3 the Supreme Judicial Court reiterated the 
rule of law governing the duty owed by business proprietors to their 
patrons: 
... The defendant, as the operator of the premises open to the 
public for business purposes, owed a duty to paying patrons to 
use reasonable care to prevent injury to them by third persons, 
whether their acts were accidental, negligent, or intentionaJ.4 
Expounding this statement of the law, the Court ruled that a merchant 
is not "relieved of liability merely because some especially violent con-
duct occurred outside its premises."5 With specific reference to the 
facts of the instant case, the Court found that "[t]he evidence war-
§2.4. !Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.K2d 420 
(1969), discussed in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.8. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 254 N.E.2d 418. 
3 Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969); 
Rawson v. Massachusetts Operating Co., 328 Mass. 558, 105 N.K2d 220 (1958). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 9, 254 N.E.2d 418, 420. 
5 Id. at 10, 245 N.E.2d at 421. 
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ranted, but did not require, a finding that the affray was a continuing 
one which began on the premises and spilled over to the street, ac-
. companied by an indication that the young men were bent on further 
violence against the plaintiffs."6 These findings, if made by the jury, 
would negate the existence of a "street fight" which was a "separate, 
independent combat."7 
Two other points of the opinion deserve mention. Erst, the Court 
noted that, although the sale or use of intoxicating liquors was a fac-
tor in many of the other cases, it is not, in principle mr in law, an in-
dispensable ingredient of the plaintiff's case. Second, the Court ruled 
that the extent to which credibility of the plaintiffs' testimony had 
been affected by any inconsistent statements during cross-examination 
is exclusively the prerogative of the jury to determine, and this pre-
rogative cannot be pre-empted by the judge in ordering a verdict.8 
~2.5. Wrongful death actions: Stillborn child. During the 1970 
SuRvEY year, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts decided ·a question of first impression under Massachusetts 
law. Henry v. ]ones1 was a diversity action brought under the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death statute2 to recover for the death of two fetuses 
·stillborn after an automobile accident in Massachusetts. The precise 
issue presented to the court was whether a viable fetus that is not born 
alive is a "person" within the meaning of the statute. According to 
Judge Garrity, that question could not be resolved by resort to abstrac-
tions as to the definition of legal personality but could only be an-
swered by "asking whether the Massachusetts policy for recovery for 
prenatal injuries will give the estate of a stillborn infant a right to 
recover damages under the Wrongful Death Statute."B· Using this ap-
proach, Judge Garrity answered the question negatively and granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Judge Garrity noted that in two cases4 the Supreme Judicial Court 
had decided that a wrongful death action does exist for prenatal in-
juries resulting in death, for both viable and nonviable fetuses after 
being born alive. However, he reasoned that the decisions in those 
cases, emphasizing the fact that the infants were born alive, indicated 
that the Massachusetts courts would hold the distinction between in-
6 ld; at 10-11, 254 N.E.2d at 421. 
7 Id, at 11, 254 N.E.2d at 421. 
s Id. at 10-11, 254 N.E.2d at 421, citing Brown v. Metropolitan Transit Author-
. ity, 345 Mass. 636, 189 N.E.2d 214 (1963); Hartmann v. Boston Herald-Traveler 
Corp., 323 Mass. 56, 80 N.E.2d 16 (1948). 
§2.5. 1 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969). This case is the subject of student 
comment in §2.21 infra. 
2 G.L., c. 229. 
3 306 F·. Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass. 1969). 
4 Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (viable 
fetus); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) 
(nonviable fetus). 
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.£ants born alive and those stillborn of such significance .that- recovery 
under the wrongful death s.tatute would be denied to the stillborn 
fetus. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Judicial Court's 
dictum in one case that "[i]f the child was stillborn the plaintiff 
would have no right of action."5 This position, Judge Garrity further 
reasoned, is not entirely indefensible: 
It is a definitive line and not an· unreasonable requirement 
when the issue is in reality the extent to which parents may re-
cover for the death of a fetus en ventre sa mere. We are talking 
about the interest of potential beneficiaries and not the interest 
of the individual injured. It is one thing to compensate an injured 
child for prenatal injuries that may accompany him into life and 
quite another to compensate his beneficiaries.6 
§2.6. Damages: Mental suffering. The general rule in Massa-
chusetts governing compensation for damages resulting from mental 
disturbance, as set out in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R./. is that "there 
can be no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, 
if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; and ... also ... 
that there can be no recovery for such physical. injuries as may be 
caused solely by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury to 
the person from without."2 The consistent adherence to this rule by 
the Supreme Judicial Court is, perhaps, best exemplified by its 1960 
decision in Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, lnc.,3 which reversed aver-
dict for the plaintiff who had suffered severe emotional shock as a re-
sult of discovering a dead mouse and fecal matter in a container from 
which she had just consumed milk. Although the plaintiff's injuries 
included a rash, sores, itching, and nausea which litsted for weeks, the 
findings of_ the auditor on which the case .was presented .to the Court 
apparently concluded that the injuries resulted not from consumption 
of the contaminated milk but from mental disturbance occasioned by 
the plaintiff's discovery of the mouse and: fecal matter. The Court re~ 
fused to hold that the ingestion constituted a battery sufficient to disc 
tinguish its earlier rule. 
Since the Sullivan decision, the Supreme Judicial Court has not been 
squarely faced with the specific issue of whether a plaintiff can recover 
for severe physical or emotional harm stemming from mental distur-
bance caused by a defendant's negligent conduct where there has not 
5 Id. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915, quoted in Henry v. Jones, 306 F. Supp~. 726, 727 
(D. Mass. 1969). · 
6 306 F. Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass. 1969). 
§2.6. 1168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), di~cussed in 1960 Ann. Sur~. Mass. Law 
§§3.4, 6.1 I. . . 
2 Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. 
3 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960), discussed in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§3.4, 6.1 I. 
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been any physical contact with the plaintiff. It has, however, addressed 
itself to the issue of awarding damages for mental disturbances in two 
other contexts. 
The first case, Proulx v. Basbanes,4 was a nuisance suit brought by 
the owners of a private home to enjoin a neighboring dry cleaning 
establishment from operating its business in such a manner as to inter-
fere with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their home, and to re-
cover damages for injury to their persons and property. Because of the 
noxious fumes emanating from the defendant's establishment, the 
noises attendant upon the use of its machinery and the unnecessary 
vibrations caused by its operations, the Court had little trouble in sus-
taining the master's determination that undoubted nuisance was vis-
ited upon the plaintiffs, entitling them to equitable relief to abate the 
nuisance and to damages to compensate them for the injury to their 
property. 
However, the Court in Proulx was presented with the more difficult 
issue raised by the master's additional award of damages for personal 
injury on the ground that the defendant's activities "profoundly dis-
turbed the plaintiffs, who were persons of ordinary sensibilities, and 
rendered them on occasion 'sick, nervous, and ill.' "o The defendants 
had taken exception to this aspect of the award, claiming, inter alia, 
that "any personal injury sustained was solely 'mental anguish,' which 
is not compensable.''6 In upholding the award in its entirety, the Court 
treated the "personal injury" as "physical ills" caused by the defen-
dant's wrongful conduct rather than the result of the plaintiffs' "men-
tal disturbance.'' Because the Court did not address itself to the ques-
tion of how to draw the line between physical and mental injury, the 
precise impact of this decision is not clear. 7 
It is possible that the Proulx Court considered the compensatory 
award for the nervous condition to be nothing more than recovery of 
"parasitic" damages. Under Massachusetts law, it is not always neces-
sary to show an impact per se in order to recover for mental injuries. 
The impact need be shown only where the plaintiff is relying upon 
the mental harm as the basis of his action. The classic example of this 
parasitic form of damage recovery is to be found in defamation cases 
where the plaintiffs, having established the tort of defamation, are 
entitled to recover for their own mental suffering.8 The Court might 
also have considered the "mental suffering" as intentionally inflicted, 
4 !154 Mass. 559, 2!18 N.E.2d 531 (1968), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §!1.4. 
II ld. at 561, 238 N.E.2d at 53!1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4. 
s See, e.g., Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450, 102 N.E. 660 (1913). 
9 See, e.g., Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921) (hotel proprietor 
used insolent language). 
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in which case recovery is permitted,9 or the defendant's conduct as a 
trespass, which would permit the recovery for "mental suffering."10 
The 1970 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination v. Franzarolill appears to be an 
extension of the exceptions to the rule precluding recovery of dam-
ages for mental injury. The case arose out of a petition brought by 
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination seeking enforce-
ment of its order in the case of an alleged unlawful refusal to rent an 
apartment because of race or color in violation of G.L., c. 151B, §4. 
After receiving a complaint and holding a hearing, the commission 
determined that the respondents had violated the statute and ordered 
them to cease racial discrimination in connection with the rental of 
housing accommodations. In addition, the respondents were ordered 
to compensate the complainant by the payment of damages in the fol-
lowing amounts: $94.50 for the cost of commuting and finding other 
housing; $500 for loss of time; and $250 for mental suffering from the 
"considerable frustrations, angers, and humiliations" of the complain-
ant.12 The commission then sought enforcement of its order and, 
though the respondent did not seek judicial review of the award, the 
Superior Court entered a decree enforcing the order to cease discrim-
ination but refused to enforce the award of damages. The commission 
then appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, contending (1) that the 
award was granted within its power and (2) that the Superior Court 
did not have power to refuse to order enforcement of the award. 
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court focused upon the con-
struction of Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 151B. Section 6 provides that 
the commission "may obtain an order" for enforcement of its orders 
by initiating a proceeding in the Superior Court which "shall have 
power ... to make and enter . . . an order or decree enforcing, mod-
ifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in 
part the order of the commission." Under Section 5, a person aggrieved 
by an award of damages, "notwithstanding· the provisions of section 
six," may seek review in a district court within ten days of notice of 
the award. Furthermore, the district court is directed to "hear wit-
nesses, review such action, and determine whether or not upon all the 
evidence such an award was justified and thereafter affirm, modify or 
reverse the order of the commission." 
On appeal, the commission argued that, because Section 5 provided 
for a separate review of the damage award by the district court, the 
Superior Court was precluded from setting aside or modifying an order 
10 Donley v. Hammond, 4 Mass. App. Dec. 13 (1952) (trespass and wrongful entry 
of cemetery lot); Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868) (removal of remains). 
Contra, White v. Dresser, 135 Mass. 150 (1883) (deprivation of lateral support to 
burial plot through "gross carelessness''). 
111970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 256 N.E.2d 311. 
12 Id. at 344, 256 N.E.2d at 312. 
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of the commission awarding damages: The Supreme Judicial Court 
disagreed, finding that the legislature provided two avenues for review 
of damage· awards by the commission, the Section 5 proceeding being 
designed to afford an aggrieved party a simple, expeditious review of 
a damage award where only that portion of the order was challenged. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court held the modification of the 
order by the Superior Court improper. 
The Supreme Judicial Court relied heavily upon the language of 
Section 5, noting that. the statute 
... explicitly empowers the commission to award "damages not to 
exceed one thousand dollars, which damages shall include, but 
shall not be limited to, the expense incurred by the [complainant] 
for obtaining alternative housing or space, for storage of goods 
and effects, for moving and for other costs actually incurred by 
him as a result o£ such unlawful practice or violation; provided, 
however, that such damages shall not include attorneys' fees." 
[Emphasis added.J13 
Finding that the commission applied the proper legal rule and that 
its order was supported by substantial evidence, the Court directed 
reinstatement of the award: 
... In view of the statutory power of the commission, and the 
recognition in our cases that damages for mental suffering may be 
recovered in appropriate cases, Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 
[1868] (wrongful removal of a child's body from its grave), Fille-
brown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 [1878] (wrongful eviction), Lombard 
v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 71 [1891] (discharge from employment), 
an award by the commission of $250 for mental suffering was not 
improper.14 
Unquestionably, the commission has the power under G.L., t. 151B, 
§5, to award "damages not to exceed onethousand dollars, which dam-
ages shall include, but shall not be limited to" those exp•~nses incurred 
by the complainant in finding other housing. Although the damage 
award for mental suffering approved in Franzaroli reflects a judicial 
concern with the major issue of housing discrimination, the rationale 
used by the Court seems to indicate a willingness to expand further 
the exceptions permitting recovery for mental damage. This is sug-
gested by the Court's use of the precedentially "appropriate cases" 
when the facts of those cases are compared with those of Franzaroli. 
Both the Meagher and FillebTOwn cases involved trespasses to prop-
erty which incidentally "inflict a serious wound upon the feelings" 15 
of the plaintiff, while Lombard involved a wrongful infringement 
13 Id. at 345-346, 256 N.E.2d at 313, quoting hom G.L., c. 151B, §5. 
14 Id. at 346, 256 N.E.2d at 313. 
15 Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 285 (1968). 
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upon a pecuniary interest which the Court felt naturally would pro-
duce mental suffering. The complainant compensated by the commis-
sion's order in Franzaroli had no proprietary or pecuniary interests in 
the property he sought to rent, and in this respect Franzaroli departs 
from the fact patterns of the previously decided "appropriate cases." 
§2.7. Defamation: Public figure: Privilege to report judicial hear-
ings. In the aftermath of the civil rights demonstrations in the early 
1960's, the United States Supreme Court was required to consider the 
constitutional limitations imposed upon an expanding law of defama-
tion by the First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of free speech 
and, derivatively, free press. The specific occasion arose in the form of 
a libel action brought by the police commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, against a northern newspaper complaining of certain statements 
made about him and his handling. of the demonstrations. Speaking for 
the majority of the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 1 Justice 
Brennan declared that: 
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 
the statement was made with "actual malice"- that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.2 
The Sullivan doctrine has since undergone considerable expansion, 
and the concept of "public figure" has now been applied to a state 
university athletic director, 3 a prominent retired air force general tak-
ing part in an effort to resist desegregation of a state university,4 a 
well-known scientist actively seeking a nuclear test ban treaty,5 a pro-
fessional major league baseball player,6 the leader of a group support-
ing a slate of officers for a party primary/ and a gambler involved in 
a political campaign in another country.8 
In Lewis v. Valtis9 and two companion cases10 decided this SURVEY 
§2.7. 1 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Justices Clark and Goldberg concurred in the result 
in separate opinions in which Justice Douglas joined. 
2 Id. at 279-280. 
3 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
4 Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
5 Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). 
6 Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968). 
7 Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968). 
s Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. 
McLaney v. Time, Inc., 395 U.S. 922 (1969). See also Annotation, 19 A.L.R.3d 1361 
(1964). 
91970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 113, 255 N.E.2d .337. 
10 The two companion cases were brought by the same plaintiff against two news-
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year, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to expand the "public figure" 
category further to include one who "had been an intermittent can· 
didate for minor elective public office, a seeker of appointment to un-
important public office, and campaign manager for a small minority 
candidate for mayor of Boston."ll 
The facts of the case, as reported in the Court's opinion, present 
multiple issues. The defendant, the owner of an automobile garage 
and repair shop, accused the plaintiff of serious misconduct when a 
controversy arose with respect to repairs made to the plaintiff's car. 
According to the defendant, the plaintiff claimed he was an assistant 
to the registrar of motor vehicles and would strip the defendant of 
his "sticker license" if he were made to pay for the repairs. Apparently 
the defendant communicated these allegations to representatives of the 
Boston Herald and Boston Globe when his license was subsequently 
suspended. These charges were reported by the Boston Herald two days 
later. After a formal hearing at the Registry of Motor Vehicles, the 
defendant was permitted to resume sticker inspections. The following 
day, these proceedings and the defendant's charges, which presumably 
were reiterated at the hearing, were reported by both newspapers. 
Claiming that defendant's charges of attempted larceny and imperson-
ation of an official of the Registry of Motor Vehicles were false, plain-
tiff brought an action in tort for defamation and recovered damages 
against the defendant garage owner and the two newspapers. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that there was an 
accusation of crime which was defamatory and concentrated its atten-
tion upon the privilege defense of the two newspapers. The Court first 
held that the Registry of Motor Vehicle hearings were judicial pro-
ceedings to which the privilege of fair reporting applied. Since the sub-
sequent newspaper stories were fair and accurate reports, made without 
malice, they were privileged and no liability attached to their publica-
tion. Consequently, the damage recovery against the Boston Globe was 
improper and had to be set aside. The privilege to report judicial pro-
ceedings, however, did not protect the Boston Herald for the story it 
published prior to the hearings. The earlier story, substantially iden-
tical to the post-hearing report, was sufficient to sustain the damage 
recovery against the Herald. 
The Court's ruling on the "public figure" defense is particularly 
interesting in light of the plaintiff's background. In 1960, the plaintiff 
was a candidate for state representative to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture, finishing fifth in a field of 21. Two years later he was a candidate 
for state senator, placing second in a field of 9. In 1963, he served as 
the campaign manager for a Boston mayoral candidate. One year later, 
papers. Lewis v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 113, 116, 255 
N.E.2d 337, 339; Lewis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 113, 119, 255 
N.E.2d 337, 341. These cases were consolidated for trial and appeal. 
11 Id. at 118, 255 N.E.2d at 341. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/5
§2.8 TORTS 39 
after the present defamation controversy arose, he again ran for the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives, finishing sixth among 21 can-
didates. The Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless deemed the plaintiff 
an unimportant figure: "Although marginally involved in politics, the 
plaintiff can hardly be said to have thrust himself into the 'vortex of 
an important public controversy.' "12 Finally, the Court ruled that the 
determination of the issue of whether the plaintiff was a public figure 
is a question of law for the judge to decide and should not have been 
submitted to the jury. 
During the 1970 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court similarly 
decided another defamation case on the basis of legal privilege. In 
Aborn v. Lipson,13 the defendant had previously brought a petition 
to remove his daughter-in-law as administratrix of his son's estate. At 
the probate hearing, the defendant testified that the plaintiff, an at-
torney, had advised his daughter-in-law to have her husband's creditors 
make their checks payable to her in order to avoid paying some of the 
estate's debts. This testimony, the plaintiff alleged, constituted a de-
famatory charge of knowingly defrauding creditors. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that the defendant's demurrer was properly sustained, 
since the testimony of a witness at a judicial proceeding which is "per-
tinent to the matter in hearing [is] absolutely privileged, even if 
uttered maliciously or in bad faith."14 As to the underlying rationale 
of the privilege, the Court stated: 
... The reason for the privilege is that it is more important 
that witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they 
say than that a person who has been defamed by their testimony 
have a remedy.15 
The Court refused to agree with the plaintiff's position that testi-
mony which is knowingly false can never be pertinent to the matter 
in hearing. The Court explained that the rule urged by the plaintiff 
"would render the privilege illusory and of little value"16 since it 
would then depend upon the knowledge, or lack of it, possessed by the 
witness testifying at the judicial proceeding. Finally, the Court held 
that the words "pertinent to the proceedings" are not to be narrowly 
construed, and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the de-
fendantP 
§2.8. Negligence: Proof of proximate cause. During the 1970 
12 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll3, liS, 255 N.E.2d 337, 341, citing and quoting from 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
13 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 297, 256 N.E.2d 442. 
14 Id. at 298, 256 N.E.2d at 443, quoting from Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 
236, liS N.E.2d 356, 358 (1954). 
15 Id. at 298, 256 N.E.2d at 443. 
16 Id. at 298-299, 256 N.E.2d at 443. 
17 Id. at 299, 256 N.E.2d at 443-444, citing and quoting from Prosser, The Law 
of Torts §109 (3d ed. 1964), and Restatement of Torts Second §588, comment c. 
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Su:RvEY year the Supreme Judicial Court decided several cases on the 
basis of an evaluation of evidence offered to prove negligence and the 
interpretation of the proximate cause doctrine. In Triangle Dress, Inc. 
v. Bay State Service, lnc., 1 the Court held that the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict should have been granted where the only evi-
dence in the record showed that an air conditioning unit burst into 
flames two hours after the defendant's repairmen, called to service it, 
left the premises. In setting aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the 
Court emphasized the fact that there was no evidence of what the re~ 
pairmeti did to the machine nor indication of what caused its original 
malfunctioning and the subsequent fire; also noted was the complete 
absence not only of expert opinion testimony but also of evidence of 
facts on which an expert opinion could be predicated to explain the 
cause of the fire. The jury was thus left "to conjecture and surmise" 
about the cause of the fire. In another case, where there was expert 
testimony and evidence as to the cause of the malfunctioning of a 
machine, the Court reached the opposite result and upheld a jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff. In Standard Paper & Merchandise Co. v. City of 
Springfield,2 the Court held a municipality liable to the lessee of a 
building for damages caused to the lessee's personalty by the bursting 
of a defective thirty-nine-year-old water meter which had been negli-
gently inspected and reinstalled on the premises by municipal em-
ployees. 
A rescript opinion in Bonds v. Cummings3 turned on the applica-
tion of the "sudden emergency" rule. The Court held that when there 
was evidence, even though disputed, that the defendant, while driving 
her car, swerved to the right to avoid an oncoming car which had just 
made a turn and thereby struck the plaintiff's parked car, jury instruc-
tions on the possible application of the "sudden emergency" rule were 
proper. 
In another case, Matranga v. West End Tile Co.,4 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court had to distinguish between the contributing, efficient cause 
and a mere condition of an accident, and held erroneous a directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant granted at the close of the plaintiffs' 
opening statement. Specifically, the Court held not demurrable an 
opening statement to the effect that (1) the defendant's agent had 
illegally parked the defendant's vehicle on a street which had been 
designed and posted as a street for coasting on sleds and (2) a minor 
child was injured when he slid into the automobile while coasting. 
The directed verdict was granted by the trial judge who ruled that the 
§2.8. 1 356 Mass. 440, 252 N.E.2d 889 (1969). 
2 356 Mass. 475, 253 N.E.2d 337 (1969). 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 363, 256 N.E.2d 319. 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 435, 257 N.E.2d 433. 
5Jd. at 436,257 N.E.2d:at434. 
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"accident was caused by the action of the boy in coasting, intentionally 
or otherwise, into the automobile."5 The Supreme Judicial Court dis-
agreed, saying: "A trier of fact would be warranted in finding that 
the position of the defendant's vehicle, in light of the foreseeable use 
of the street by young children on relatively uncontrollable sleds, was 
a proximate cause of the accident."6 
§2.9. Highway "defects". General Laws, c. 84, §15, imposes lia-
bility upon a municipality for injuries sustained "by reason of a defect 
or want of repair ... in or upon" a roadway. In previous opinions, 
the Court has defined "defect" or "want of repair" as "anything in the 
state or condition of the highway which renders it unsafe or incon-
venient for ordinary travel,"1 and has stated that the terms are not 
restricted to "conditions appearing upon the surface of the way but 
may extend to obstructions overhanging the way and to structures and 
objects that may fall on or in the way."2 In still other cases, the Court 
has permitted recovery for conditions existing under the roadway 
which produced defects in the roadway itsel£.3 In the 1970 SuRVEY 
year, the Court had to decide for the first time whether a condition 
existing "under the way, but unrelated to the specific conditions of the 
way" was a "defect" within the meaning of the statute, and answered 
the question negatively. 
The plaintiffs in Daigneault v. Town of Auburn4 were injured when 
they suddenly "felt a bump" in the road and skidded into an embank-
ment. Claiming the accident resulted from the accumulation of icy 
water four or five inches deep for some 35 to 40 feet caused by a 
blocked culvert three or four feet under the road, the plaintiffs brought 
an action of tort under the statute. The case came to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court on plaintiff's exception to jury instructions given by the 
court below. In essence, the trial judge instructed the jury that the 
culvert was not part of the highway and therefore its defective condi-
tion did not constitute a "defect" in the way itself. However, he fur-
ther instructed the jury that it could consider what effect the blocked 
culvert had in causing water to flow onto the highway which might 
have rendered it unsafe for ordinary travel. In approving these in-
structions, the Court said its previous cases "allowed recovery only 
because the conditions under the roadway produced defects in the 
6 Id. at 437, 257 N.E.2d at 435. 
§2.9. 1 Gregoire v. City of Lowell, 253 Mass. 119, 121, 148 N.E. 376, 376-377 
(1925); Whalen v. Worcester Elec. Light Co., 307 Mass. 169, 174, 29 N.E.2d 763, 767 
(1940). 
2 Id. at 174, 29 N.E.2d at 767. 
3 Connelly v. City of Boston, 206 Mass. 4, 91 N.E. 998 (1910); Bleistine v. City of 
Chelsea, 204 Mass. 105, 90 N.E. 526 (1910); Fleming v. City of Springfield, 154 Mass. 
520, 28 N.E. 910 (1891). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 923, 259 N.E.2d 574. 
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roadway itself" and concluded that "[u]nless the conditions existing 
under the roadway can be related to the state of the way itself, they 
are not material to the existence of a defect in the way itself." 5 
§2.10. Automobiles: Rear end collisions. Several years ago, the 
Supreme Judicial Court formulated the following rule applicable to 
rear end collisions in motor vehicle cases: 
Evidence of a rear end collision without evidence of the circum-
stances under which it happens is not proof of the negligence of 
the operator of either vehicle, and the rule of res ipsa loquitur 
does not apply, but that slight evidence of the circumstances "may 
place the fault."1 
On two occasions in the 1970 SuRvEY year, the Court was called upon 
to apply this rule and concluded on the facts before it that the plain-
tiffs had not satisfied this slight burden. In the first case,2 the Court 
noted the absence of evidence concerning the position of the two ve-
hicles when stopped, as well as the absence of evidence that the plain-
tiff's car was struck with such force that an inference of negligence 
would be permissible. The Court also alluded to the fact that there 
was some indication that the defendant's car was first struck by a third 
car before colliding with that of the plaintiff. A similar situation was 
presented in the second case.3 Together, the two cases demonstrate the 
necessity for plaintiff to introduce some evidence of the defendant's 
manner of driving which allegedly caused the collision. 
§2.11. Landlord and tenant. The Supreme Judicial Court's deci-
sion in Berger v. Stoner1 involved the application of the long-estab-
lished principle of Massachusetts law that a landlord is not liable for 
any injuries caused by defective conditions in the leased premises un-
less he has agreed to make repairs and makes them neg;ligently.2 The 
plaintiffs were tenants at will in the defendant's bungalow with an 
oral agreement that the defendant would make all necessary repairs, 
inside and out. The defendant had removed and planed the back door 
after the plaintiffs' complaint. The door worked properly for about 
two weeks thereafter, but then began sticking intermittently until the 
5 Id at 925, 259 N.E.2d at 576. 
§2.10. 1 Buda v. Foley, 302 Mass. 411, 412-413, 19 N.E.2d 537-538 (1939). See also 
Jennings v. Bragdon, 289 Mass. 595, 597, 194 N.E. 697, 698 (1935); Hendler v. Coffey, 
278 Mass. 339, 179 N.E. 801 (1932); Woolner v. Perry, 265 Mass. 74, 163 N.E. 750 
(1928); Froio v. Eastern Massachusetts St. Ry., 247 Mass. 474, 142 N.E. 255 (1924); 
Reardon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 247 Mass. 124, 141 N.E. 857 (1923); and Sandler 
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 238 Mass. 148, 130 N.E. 104 (1921). 
2 Varisco v. Malovin, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 171, 255 N.E.2d 190. 
:l Frazier v. Cordialino, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1355, 253 N.E.2d 84:1. 
§2.11. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 259 N.E.2d 774. 
2 See, e.g., Koleshinski v. David, 328 Mass. 276, 103 N.E.2d 262 (1952); Cleary v. 
Union Realty Co., 300 Mass. 312, 15 N.E.2d 184 (1938); Galvin v. Beals, 187 Mass. 
250, 72 N.E. 969 (1905). 
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date of the accident, when the tenant's wife put her hand through a 
pane of glass while attempting to close the door. On this record, the 
Court held that it was error to deny the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict. Distinguishing prior cases,a the Court found the plain-
tiffs' case to be fatally defective because "[t]here [was] nothing in the 
record to permit the inference of any connection between the defen-
dant's planing of the door ... and the injury to [the plaintiff] .... "4 
In analyzing this decision, it is important to note that the action 
was not in contract for breach of agreement to make repairs nor in tort 
for negligence in failing to make repairs after notice, both of which 
factors the Court carefully pointed out.5 
In another case,6 the Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of a child 
who was injured while visiting her aunt. The child fell to the ground 
from a third-story porch through an opening between the railings at 
the top of the steps which led to the second-floor level. When the 
aunt's tenancy began, the porch was approximately level and in good 
condition. Thereafter, due to physical deterioration, the porch began 
to pull away from the house and was slanted or pitched at least four 
inches at the time of the accident. "Predicated on these facts," the 
Court said, "the jury could reasonably conclude that the change in the 
pitch of the porch, in relation to its proximity to the opening at the 
head of the steps, created a hazardous condition to invitees of the 
tenant such as the [child] and was the proximate cause of her injury." 7 
§2.12. Implied warranties in real-estate transactions. In Albano 
v. Western Construction Corp., 1 the plaintiffs requested the Supreme 
Judicial Court to hold that implied warranties arise in the sale of a 
newly constructed house. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the Court to 
rule that "when the defendant sold to them a house which it had built 
for sale, it impliedly warranted that the house had been constructed 
in a good and workmanlike manner and that it was fit for human 
habitation .... "2 Finding the plaintiffs' allegations of express warran-
ties not substantiated by the record, the Court declined to rule on the 
implied warranty theory since the case was tried, argued, and decided 
below principally on the theory of express warranty. The issue sought 
to be raised by the plaintiffs in this case has never been squarely ad-
dressed by the Supreme Judicial Court. When it finally arises in a 
3 Cleary v. Union Realty Co., 300 Mass. 312, 15 N.E.2d 184 (1938); Koleshinski v. 
David, 328 Mass. 276, 103 N.E.2d 262 (1952). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 977, 259 N.E.2d 774, 776. 
5 The Court cited Ryerson v. Fall River Philanthropic Burial Soc., 315 Mass. 244, 
52 N.E.2d 688 (1943); J<'iorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919); Lane 
v. Raynes, 223 Mass. 514, 112 N.E. 152 (1916); Tuttle v. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 
169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). 
6 Varney v. Donovan, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 228, 255 N.E.2d 605. 
7 Ibid. 
§2.12. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 963, 260 N.E.2d 212. 
2 Id. at 967-968, 260 N.E.2d at 215. 
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proper case, it will be a matter of first impression in the Common-
wealth. 
§2.13. Interference with contractual relations. In Grammenos 
v. Zolotas,1 the Supreme Judicial Court held it improper to sustain 
defendants' demurrers in an action for tortious interference with con-
tractual relations. The case involved a contract made by the plaintiffs, 
a minor child and her parents, with an immigrant iUegally in the 
United States prior to his marriage to the plaintiff child. Under the 
contract, the immigrant husband changed his savings account with the 
defendant credit union into a joint account for himself and his wife. 
He delivered possession of the passbook to the plaintiff parents so that 
no withdrawals could be made by him without their consent. The pur-
pose of this arrangement was to secure his obligation to repay the par-
ents sums expended by them in connection with the marriage of their 
daughter and as a guarantee against immigration difficulties. 
A complaint alleged that the defendant, acting individually and as 
president of the defendant credit union, and with knowledge of the 
marriage, contract, and immigration situation of the husband, "inten-
tionally, maliciously and unlawfully induced" the husband to breach 
his contract and deliver to him all monies in the account without de-
livery of the passbook. The complaint was held sufficient to state a 
cause of action in tort for unlawful interference with contractual rela-
tions. In sustaining the plaintiffs' exceptions to the directed verdict 
entered in favor of the defendants, the Supreme Judicial Court said: 
"If such interference was intentional and without lawful justification 
it was malicious in law although it arose from good motives and with-
out express malice."2 
§2.14. Unfair competition: Trade secrets. During the 1970 SURVEY 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court decided the rather complex case of 
]. T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, lnc.} and two 
companion cases2 raising questions of agency, corporations, and trade 
secrets. The controversy, insofar as it involved the law of trade 
secrets, was precipitated by the defendant's departure from the plain-
tiff's employ and subsequent institution of a competing jewelry 
findings business allegedly through the pirating of plaintiff's trade 
secrets. 
The case came before the supreme Judicial Court on the basis of a 
master's report which contained the finding, inter alia, that the dies 
and production processes utilized by the plaintiff were trade secrets. 
However, the master's report also indicated that "[t]here was no 
§2.13. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 35, 254 N.E.2d 789. 
2 Id. at 37, 254 N.E.2d at 791. 
§2.14. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1051, 260 N.E.2d 723. 
2 The companion cases, consolidated with the principal case, we1re J. T. Healy & 
Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy, and J. T. Healy & Son, Inc, v. James A. Murphy & 
Son, Inc. 
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written notice to employees nor admonishment against discussing the 
processes when they should be outside the plant";3 nor were the 
employees required to sign nondisclosure agreements. This, the master 
found, was "company policy based on the theory that the best way to 
guard the secret was not to excite undue interest."4 Viewed against this 
background, the Court held the master's finding of trade secrets in-
correct. "[I]£ the person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its 
exclusive use in his own business," the Court ruled, "he must not fail 
to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep it secret."5 The com-
pany policy not to excite undue interest in the dies and production 
processes, to which the lack of protective procedures could be at-
tributed, became decisive. The Court adopted the position of a 
nationally known member of the patent bar and said: 
... [O]ne who claims that he has a trade secret must exercise 
eternal vigilance. This calls for constant warnings to all persons 
to whom the trade secret has become known and obtaining from 
each an agreement, preferably in writing, acknowledging its 
secrecy and promising to respect it. To exclude the public from 
the manufacturing area is not enough. 6 
§2.15. Agency: Lent employees. In Ledbetter v. M. B. Foster 
Electric Co.,l the Supreme Judicial Court, in a rescript opinion, held 
that a directed verdict for the defendant should have been granted 
in an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from an electrical 
flash fire caused by the malfunctioning of a grill in a department store. 
The grill had been negligently repaired by individuals who were 
employees of the defendant and paid by the defendant. However, they 
worked steadily at the department store and took their orders directly 
from the defendant's foreman who in turn received his orders from 
an electrician in the department store's employ. "In this instance," 
the Supreme Judicial Court concluded, "the [defendant's] employees 
did not continue liable to the direction and control of the defendant 
but were subject to that of [the department store] to which they were 
lent."2 For this reason, the Court decided that a verdict had been im-
properly entered against the defendant. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§2.16. Motor vehicle accidents: No-fault standard. The most 
significant legislative enactment during the 1970 SuRvEY year was 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1051, 1059, 260 N.E.2d 723, 730. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Id. at 1060, 260 N.E.2d at 730. 
6 Id. at 1061, 260 N.E.2d at 731, citing Frederick P. Fish, Esq., of the Boston Bar 
in 29 Proc. Am. Soc. Mechanical Engrs. 13 (1907). 
§2.15. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1099, 260 N.E.2d 174. 
2 Ibid. 
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Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1970, which establishes in Massachusetts a 
limited no-fault insurance recovery plan to compensate "victims" for 
actual losses sustained as a result of motor vehicle accidents. The 
statute is quite detailed, even more complex, and has already been the 
subject of litigation, including a decision on its constitutionality by 
the Supreme Judicial Court.! Its provisions and the problems it 
creates are presented in Chapter 22. 
§2.17. Credit bureaus: Erroneous credit information. Chapter 93 
of the General Laws providing for the regulation of certain trades and 
enterprises has been the subject of legislative attention during recent 
years. Last year it was amended by Chapter 442 of the Acts of 1969, 
which inserted a new statute regulating certain practices of credit 
bureaus.1 Essentially, the 1969 amendment sought to proltect consumers 
and employees from inaccurate reports of credit bureaus. All lenders 
and employers or prospective employers who refused to extend credit 
to an individual, or who fired or refused to hire an individual, wholly 
or partly on the basis of a credit report, were required to reveal this 
fact to the individual affected and apprise him of the name and address 
of the reporting bureau.2 Credit bureaus were required to disclose the 
contents and source of the report to the individual without charge.3 
Except for bankruptcies, credit bureaus were not permitted to report 
information concerning transactions more than seven years old.4 Failure 
to comply with any of these provisions was expressly declared an 
unfair trade practice under the state's "Baby" Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.5 
Chapter 93 was further amended during the 1970 SuRvEY year by 
Chapter 794 of the Acts of 1970, which added a new section providing 
that credit bureaus shall be liable in damages for gross negligence in 
furnishing information which either is erroneous or relates to trans-
actions more than seven years old, 6 whether the information is 
furnished orally or in writing. The gross negligence standard appears 
to be a compromise between the pre-existing duty imposed upon credit 
bureaus to avoid reckless conduct7 and the traditional duty to exercise 
ordinary care imposed upon most businesses. 
§2.18. Minors: Consent to drug treatment. Chapter 112 of the 
§2.16. 1 Aetna Casualty &: Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1411, 263 N.E.2d 698. 
§2.17. 1 The amendment inserted §§44-47 in G.L., c. 93. 
2 G.L., c. 93, §45. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Id. §46. 
5 G.L., c. 93A, §§1-10. 
6 The amendment inserted §46A in G.L., c. 93. 
7 See Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515,, 174 N.E.2d 376 
(1961) (holding, inter alia, that credit bureaus possess a conditional privilege under 
the law of defamation). 
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General Laws was amended by Chapter 816 of the Acts of 1970, which 
added Section 12D. Under this section, a minor twelve years of age or 
older who is found to be drug-dependent by two or more physicians may 
give his consent to the furnishing of hospital and medical care related to 
the diagnosis or treatment of his drug dependency. His consent 
cannot be disaffirmed because of minority. The statute expressly 
provides that the consent of the child's parent or guardian is not neces-
sary and that they shall not be liable for the payment of any care 
rendered under Section 12D. The section does not apply to methadone 
maintenance therapy. 
§2.19. Emergency medical treatment of minors. Chapter 112 of 
the General Laws was amended by Chapter 84 7 of the Acts of 1970, 
which added Section 12E. The new statute provides that no physician 
shall incur civil damage liability "for failure to obtain consent" of a 
"parent or parents, guardian or guardians or other persons having 
custody or control of a minor child, or of the spouse of a patient, to 
emergency examination and treatment, including blood transfusions, 
when delay in treatment will endanger the life, limb, or mental well 
being of the patient .... " The statute also states that hospitals shall 
not be liable for any such examination and treatment by a physician 
therein. 
The new statute raises several questions. First and foremost is the 
question of whether a physician is protected when he non-negligently 
administers essential or medically advisable treatment to a minor after 
the parents have refused consent. Under the statute, it is possible to 
argue that the "refusal" of the parents to give consent amounts 
to a "failure to obtain consent" so that the physician is pro-
tected, but the statute does not require this interpretation. Another 
question arises as to the rights of the patient's spouse, namely, whether 
a physician is protected under the statute when he administers treat-
ment to a consenting minor child without seeking the consent of the 
patient's minor or adult spouse. Questions such as these undermine 
the efficacy of the statute since they can only be resolved through sub-
sequent judicial interpretation. 
§2.20. Unauthorized use of name, portrait or picture. Until the 
close of the nineteenth century, there was no express recognition in 
any English or American decision of what is now known as the "right 
to privacy."1 The year 1890 saw the publication of the now famous 
law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, an 
article which is presently considered primarily responsible for the 
creation of the tort of invasion of privacy.2 Although the meaning 
and scope of the term "right to privacy" has proved most difficult to 
§2.20. 1 See, e.g., Prosser, The Law of Torts §112 (3d eel. 1964). 
2 Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
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analyze conceptually,s the tort has now become firmly rooted in 
American jurisprudence. 
The tort of invasion of privacy was first definitively established in 
New York in the aftermath of a 1902 decision by the Court of Appeals, 
holding that no tort was committed by the defendant's unauthorized 
use of the picture of a pulchritudinous young lady to advertise its 
product.4 The decision was most unpopular. Responding to the ensuing 
public discontent, the New York legislature enacted a statute making 
the use of the name, portrait or picture of any person for advertising 
purposes or for the purposes of trade without his written consent both 
a misdemeanor and a tort.5 This 1903 New York statute has finally 
made the journey to Massachusetts and has become a part of our 
juris prudence. 
Chapter 592 of the Acts of 1970 amended G.L., c. 214, by the addi-
tion of Section 3A. The new section provides that "[a]ny person whose 
name, portrait or picture is used within the commonwealth for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without his written 
consent may bring a bill in equity" to prevent or restrain its use "and 
may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of [its] use." 
In cases where the defendant knowingly used the plaintiiff's image im-
properly, the statute provides that "the court, in its discretion, may 
award the plaintiff treble the amount of damages sustained by him." 
The Massachusetts legislature carefully followed the New York 
statute and confined the scope of this flat prohibition. By express 
language, Section 3A does not apply to photographers exhibiting 
specimens of their work in or about their studios unless they continue 
to do so after written objection has been made by the portrayed 
individual. Similarly, the new section is generally inapplicable to the 
use of the name, portrait or picture of famous persons or manufacturers 
and dealers. 
C. STUDENT CoMMENT 
§2.21. Wrongful death statute: Prenatal death: Henry v. Jones.1 
Plaintiff Mrs. Henry and her husband, residents of New Hampshire, 
were in an automobile collision in Massachusetts. At the time of the 
accident Mrs. Henry was pregnant with viable2 twin fetuses which 
3 See, e.g., Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right of Privacy"?, 4 S. Dak. L. Rev. l 
(1959). See also Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W. 
2d 762; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., :~02 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953). 
4 Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, c. 132, §§1-2, now, as amended, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§50-
51 (McKinney 1948). 
§2.2L 1 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 Viability is defined as the ability of the unborn child to live outside the uterus. 
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were subsequently stillborn. She sued as administratrix of the estates 
of the two baby boys under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute,s 
alleging that their deaths resulted from injuries sustained in the 
collision. 
The case was heard in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts on the ground of diversity, both parties 
agreeing that Massachusetts tort law applied. The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss the wrongful death actions of the stillborn children. 
The court stated that the issue was whether a viable fetus which was 
stillborn was a person within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. 
The court, in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, HELD: that 
since a stillborn viable fetus is not a person within the meaning of the 
wrongful death statute, an action for its wrongful death could not be 
maintained. 
The opinion of the court initially stated that the issue would be 
decided by ascertaining what the Massachusetts policy regarding 
recovery for prenatal death is in such a case, and not by attempting 
to define legal personality. Though the precise issue had not been 
decided in the state courts, this court looked to the dictum in Keyes 
v. Construction Service) Inc.4 That case held that a wrongful death 
action could be maintained for a viable fetus which suffers prenatal 
injuries which cause its death after birth. However, the dictum in the 
case states that "if the child was stillborn the plaintiff would have no 
right of action."5 In Torigian v. Watertown News Co.)6 also cited by 
the court,7 the Supreme Judicial Court extended the right to maintain 
an action for wrongful death to a fetus which was nonviable at the 
time of injury but which was born alive and subsequently died as a 
result of the injury. Although Torigian did not mention a live birth 
requirement, it cited Keyes as a basis of recovery for prenatal injuries 
without criticizing the dictum requiring live birth. 
The district court concluded from the two aforementioned cases 
that the law of Massachusetts demanded that recovery be conditioned 
on live birth.8 The court furnished support for this result by positing 
two policy reasons: (1) live birth is the requirement under the law of 
The term is used to describe a fetus which has reached such a stage of development 
that it is theoretically capable of extrauterine life. Dorland, American Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (21st ed. 1948). 
3 G.L., c. 229, §2: "A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person 
in the exercise of due care, or (2) by wilful, wanton or reckless act causes the death 
of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered dam-
ages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted ... shall be liable in dam-
ages ... to be assessed with reference to the degree of his culpability .... " 
4 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960). 
5 Id. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915. 
6 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967). 
7 306 F. Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass. 1969). 
Slbid. 
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property;9 and (2) compensation should go to the injured party and 
not to his beneficiaries.1o 
The court in Henry v. jones, mindful of the Erie doctrine,ll was 
probably correct in adhering to the dictum of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in reaching its decision, since no controlling 
state court precedent existed. The question arises, however, whether 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court will follow its own dictum 
when presented with a similar case. The modern trend of the law 
definitely seems to be toward recognizing the right to recover for the 
wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus, although there are notable 
deviations.12 
The issue of whether live birth should be a prerequisite to recovery 
for tortious injury to a viable fetus under Massachusetts law has been 
the subject of previous SuRvEY comment.13 The present comment will 
explore, in greater detail and in the light of recent decisions, the 
arguments regarding the live birth requirement. In deciding whether 
to a11ow recovery for the wrongful death of stillborn viable fetus, courts 
consider four major questions: (1) whether a fetus is a person within 
the meaning of the state's wrongful death statute; (2) whether public 
policy dictates allowing recovery in such a case; (3) what is the most 
logical point in the development of the human being at which to 
begin to allow recovery for wrongful death; (4) whether damages are 
speculative when death precedes birth. Each question will be con-
sidered in relation to Massachusetts law. 
v 4 Tiffany, Real Property §1127 (3d ed. 1939). 
10 306 F. Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass. 1969). 
11 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that in cases brought in federal 
court, when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the court must apply 
the substantive law of the state in which it sits. As to the varyinfr ways the federal 
courts ascertain the law of a state when only dicta of the state's highest court covers 
the legal issue, see Note, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 602 (1962). 
12 The following cases have held that an action for the wrongful death of a still-
born viable fetus is maintainable: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 
249 (1957); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan 
v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. 
Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d I (1962); Mitchell 
v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 7I 
(1964); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 
221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E. 
2d 106 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 4!! (1964); Todd v. 
Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 
F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.l:d 617 (1969). The 
following recent cases have held that an action for the wrongful d·eath of a stillborn 
viable fetus is not maintainable: Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 
530 (1968); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); O'Neill v. Morse, 
20 Mich. App. 679, 174 N.W.2d 575 (1969); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 
138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 47E:, 248 N.E.2d 901 
(1969); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968). 
13 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.10 at 42. That comment gives helpful back-
ground on this topic. 
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Courts have consistently stated the issue of whether to allow recovery 
for a stillborn fetus in terms of whether such a being is to be considered 
a person within the meaning of the state's wrongful death act.14 In the 
Massachusetts case of Dietrich v. Northampton,15 the first such case 
decided in America, Justice Holmes stated the issue as "whether an 
infant dying before it was able to live separated from its mother could 
be said to have become a person recognized by the law .... "16 Eighty-
five years later, the court in Henry stated that its decision was based 
solely on the answer to the inquiry "whether a viable fetus that is not 
born alive is a 'person' within the meaning of Massachusetts' Wrong-
ful Death Statute."17 
A recent New York case, Endresz v. Friedberg,1 8 which denied 
recovery for a stillborn viable fetus, illustrates the reasoning for and 
against including a viable fetus within the statutory definition. The 
New York death statute,19 in relevant extract, states : 
The ... administrator ... of a decedent . . . may maintain an 
action to recover damages for a wrongful act ... against a natural 
person who ... would have been liable to an action in favor of 
the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued. 
The majority of the court, in holding that a fetus is not to be in-
cluded in the term decedent, stated: "Before there may be a 
'decedent,' there must, perforce, be birth .. , and, although the 
statute .. , is silent on the subject, it is fairly certain that the Legis-
lature did not intend to include an 'unborn' foetus within the term 
'decedent.' "20 Other recent recent state decisions holding the action 
unmaintainable have given similar reasons.21 
The dissent in Endresz argued that the language in a statute should 
be interpreted in light of the dominant purpose of the legislation. The 
dominant purpose of this statute was to allow the next of kin a cause 
14 G.L., c. 229, §2 states "A person who ... causes the death of a person ... 
shall be liable in damages .... " (Emphasis added.) 
15 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
16 Id. at 16, referring to Pub. Sts., c. 52, §17 (1881 ), the predecessor of the present 
Massachusetts wrongful death statute. See 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.10 for a 
more complete discussion of the case. 
17 306 F. Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass. 1969). 
18 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969). 
19 N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law §5-4.1 (McKinney 1967). 
20 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903 (1969). 
21 Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); Powers 
v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 169, 156 N.W.2d 530, 532 (1968) (majority opinion). 
In O'Neill v. Morse, 20 Mich. App. 679, 174 N.W.2d 575 (1969), the plaintiff con-
tended that the trial court's holding that a stillborn fetus is not a person within the 
meaning of the wrongful death statute denied the fetus "due process of the law" 
and "equal protection of the law" under the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV) and the Michigan Constitution (Mich. Const. art. I, §2). On appeal 
the court, relying on Powers v. City of Troy, supra, held in a 2 to 1 decision that a 
stillborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of these clauses. 
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of action for damages suffered by the loss of the decedent. The dissent 
reasoned that the one condition imposed by the statute was fulfilled by 
the fetus: that the cause of action be one that could be sued on, had 
death not occurred.22 Other recent cases in both federal and state 
courts have pursued similar lines of reasoning.23 
Arguments concerning statutory construction are central to judicial 
construction of the word person in the Massachusetts wrongful 
death statute. Massachusetts recognizes both viable and nonviable 
fetuses as "persons" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute 
when the fetus survives birth,24 but no precedent exists to dictate how 
the court will interpret the word person when the fetus is stillborn. 
However, for a court to either allow or deny recovery for a stillborn 
viable fetus by stating that the fetus does or does not come within the 
meaning of the term person in a wrongful death statme simply begs 
the question. All state statutes are silent on the question, and courts 
have split in their decisions on the issue.25 Most cases recently decided, 
holding either for or against recovery, have not based their decisions 
solely on statutory construction.26 These opinions enumerate policy 
reasons in support of their holdings. These policy considerations will 
be discussed in order to evaluate their validity and in particular to 
determine if they are applicable to Massachusetts law. 
An action for prenatal injury is to be distinguished from an action 
for prenatal death. The former is a common law tort action, while 
the latter must be brought within the scope of a statute.2'1 Additionally, 
there is a difference as to who will be compensated by recovery. When 
the injured fetus survives, he is the one to be compensated; however, 
when the fetus dies before birth, compensation inures to the next of 
kin. Courts28 and commentators29 have stressed this point in arguing 
against recovery for prenatal death. They reason that as far as public 
policy is concerned, the reason for compensation is not so strong in the 
prenatal death cases because the injured party will not suffer through 
a lifetime from the effects of the injuries. 
Although this reasoning is sound as far as it goes, legislatures in 
every state have promulgated a different public policy in enacting 
22 24 N.Y.2d 478, 491, 248 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1969). New York had previously allowed 
an action to be maintained for an injured viable fetus born alive. Woods v. Lancet, 
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). 
23 Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 196, 156 N.W.2d 530, 545 (dissenting 
opinion); Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D.W. Va. 1969). 
24 Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967). 
25 See note 12 supra. 
26 Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969), devotes little 
discussion to anything but statutory construction. 
27 McCormick, Damages §93 (1935). 
28 Henry v. Jones, 306 F. Supp. 726, 727; Endresz v. Friedberg, 2{ N.Y .2d 478, 484, 
248 N.E.2d 901, 904 (1969). 
29 Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579, 594-595 {1965); Note, 69 
Dick. L. Rev. 258, 265 (1965). 
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wrongful death statutes. As indicated by the dissent in the Endresz. 
case, "[t]he wrongful death statute in this State, as in others, represents 
the law's recognition that pecuniary aid or assistance will be extended 
by next of kin one to another."30 Although it can be said that the 
rationale for compensation is perhaps not so compelling in the case 
of prenatal death, to reject it altogether is to deny a fundamental 
raison d'etre of wrongful death statutes. 
Whether much weight should be given to the foregoing policy con-
sideration against recovery within the context of the Massachusetts 
decisions is questionable. The Supreme Judicial Court has allowed 
recovery in the case of a nonviable fetus which died two and one-half 
hours after birth as a result of injuries sustained in utero.31 For a fetus 
to survive birth in such a case is a fortuitious occurrence, since the 
term nonviable means that the fetus is not sufficiently developed to 
be capable of living outside the uterus,32 or at least that the chances 
of a nonviable fetus surviving birth and living longer than a few hours 
are very slight. It is evident that the Court, by allowing recovery in 
Torigian, did not consider compensation of the injured party to ~e 
dispositive. It effectuated the punitive nature of the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute (discussed infra), since compensation under thh 
statute is of course given to a party other than the one injured. 
A third consideration in a prenatal death case is that the court must 
determine at what point in the biological development of a human 
being the evolving entity should be recognized as legally alive. Any one 
of three points in the development of the human being could serve 
as the differentiation point for such a determination. These are con-
ception, viability and birth. From the standpoint of legal "life," each 
has its particular advantages and disadvantages. 
It has been suggested in a recent article that any infant conceived 
should be given the right to recover for tortious injury resulting in 
prenatal death.33 Medical fact gives weight to this suggestion: 
The newly conceived fetus possesses something not possessed by 
its individual components [the spermatozoon and ovum], the 
genetic (D.N.A.) code, which transmits the human constitution .... 
[O]nce spermatozoon and ovum meet and the conceptus is formed, 
there is an 80 percent chance that unless deliberately aborted, the 
being will be delivered as a living child.34 
In spite of recent advances in medical knowledge, it is not likely that 
a court will extend a cause of action to a stillborn nonviable fetus in 
30 24 N.Y.2d 478, 490, 248 N.E.2d 901, 907 (1969). See also White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 
527. 458 p .2d 617 (1969). 
31 Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 447, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967). 
32 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966). 
33 Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 Hastings L.J. 
51, 53-56 (1969). 
34 Id. at 51. 
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the near future, because the nonviable fetus cannot theoretically 
survive separation from the mother. For this reason it is much more 
difficult for a court to consider a nonviable fetus a distinct being than 
to so consider a viable fetus or an infant. 
Courts and commentators who favor the live birth standard admit 
that it is an arbitrary limitation which may sometimes result in 
injustice because the difference between a fetus and an infant may be 
only a matter of minutes.a5 However, they cite the fact that no court 
has allowed a death action for the stillbirth of a nonviable fetus.36 
They conclude from this that since a cutoff point must be established 
to distinguish situations which will constitute a cause of action from 
those which will not, the most reasonable point would be birth. "Thus, 
since any limitation will be arbitrary in nature, a tangible and con-
crete event would be the most acceptable and workable boundary. 
Birth ... meets this requirement."37 
Viability, the third possible differentiation point, is the standard 
used by the majority of courts faced with the issue.3s One of its 
disadvantages is that, like the birth standard, it is arbitrary.39 More-
over, viability is an elusive standard because it is relative to the 
individual fetus. " 'Viability' of a fetus is not a constant, but depends 
on the anatomical and functional development of the particular 
baby."4° Yet it is possible for medical investigation to determine, by 
applying various criteria, whether a fetus was viable. Although no 
single criterion is determinant, a positive result from each of several 
criteria ahows practical certitude of viability.41 The criteria include 
the weight of the fetus, the crown-to-heel length and the distribution 
of centers of ossification in the skeleton.42 
There are a number of reasons why the majority of courts have con-
sidered the viability standard to be more appropriate than that of 
birth. The primary reason is that many courts believe life begins when 
the fetus reaches the stage of viability. "In truth, life, not birth, is the 
sole significant criteria [sic]."43 A viable fetus has been termed a 
living child. "A viable unborn child is, in fact, biologically speaking, 
a presently existing person and a living human being, because it has 
reached such a state of development that it can presently live outside 
35 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 486, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1969), citing 
Note, 69 Dick. L. Rev. 258, 268 (1965). See also Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 
Mich. L. Rev. 579, 593-594 (1965). 
36 Note, supra, at 268. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See note 12 supra. 
39 Note, 69 Dick. L. Rev. 258, 268 (1965). 
40 Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 Hastings L.J. 
51, 54 (1969). 
41 Polson, Essentials of Forensic Medicine 440 (2d rev. ed. 1965). 
42 Id. at 441-442. 
43 Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 491, 248 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1969). 
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the female body, as well as within it."44 Biology supports this 
reasoning.45 
Besides allowing the point of legal determination of life to coincide 
with the point determined by the science of biology, moving the 
differentiation point back from birth to viability has other significant 
results. It reduces the illogical protection, inherent in the live birth 
standard, of the tort-feasor who does greater harm. "For example, a 
doctor ... whose negligent acts ... produced the baby's death [before 
birth] would be legally immune from a lawsuit. However, if [he] 
badly injured the child [he] would be exposed to liability."46 This 
same problem has been explained in terms of duty . 
. . . By not allowing recovery for stillbirth, but allowing recovery 
when there is live birth, the Court would impliedly hold that a 
duty of due care was owed in the latter case but not in the former. 
This dichotomy is unreasonable since the defendant's duty would 
thus be determined retroactively by the final result of his act. A 
duty once owed should always be owed ... ,"47 
The proponents of the viability standard do not acknowledge that this 
irrationality persists with their standard. Indeed it does, although con-
cededly in fewer cases and to a lesser degree. For instance, a tort-
feasor may kill a nonviable fetus and be immune, but if it survives 
to viability or birth with injury, he then becomes liable. 
Still another effect of the use of the viability standard is that it 
tends to make the legal recognition given to the fetus uniform through-
out the law. Courts have striven for uniformity since first granting 
the fetus rights in tort.48 A federal judge, in applying the viability 
standard, stated that it had "the appeal of consistency, a consideration 
which ought to carry some weight in the making of judicial deci-
sions."49 
In New York, where the courts require live birth for recovery,50 
acceptance of the viability standard would be particularly effective 
in making the rights of the fetus uniform un~er tort and criminal 
law. This is due to the recent penal law amendment which states that 
an abortion is justifiable when "committed upon a female with her 
consent by a duly licensed physician acting ... within twenty-four 
weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy."51 The words of the 
44 White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 536, 458 P.2d 617, 622 (1969). 
45 Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579, 593 (1965). 
46 Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 148 N.W.2d 
107, 110 (1967). 
47 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.10 at 47. 
48 Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 635, 165 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1960). 
49 Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D.W. Va. 1969). 
50Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,482,248 N.E.2d 901,902 (1969). 
51 N.Y. Rev. Penal Law §125.05(3) (McKinney 1967), as amended by Acts of 1970, 
c. 127. 
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statute confer legal existence upon the fetus twenty-four weeks after 
conception; its existence after that point can only be j1eopardized by 
the necessity of aborting to save the life of the mother. Twenty-eight 
weeks after conception, the fetus is termed viable.52 The four-week 
difference could be interpreted as a safety margin to ensure that a fetus 
which reaches the developmental stage of viability before the average 
age of twenty-eight weeks will not be aborted except to save the life 
of the mother. Massachusetts has recognized the legal existence of the 
fetus as a person in both property law5s and criminal law.54 By 
recognizing the viable fetus as a person within the meaning of the 
wrongful death statute, the Massachusetts court decisions would move 
toward greater standardization of the rights of the fetus throughout 
the various branches of the law. 
If a court does allow a cause of action for the death of a stillborn 
viable fetus, it is then faced with the issue of damages. The court must 
determine if damages do, in fact, exist. A number of courts, in denying 
recovery for a stillborn viable fetus, have stated that the state's wrong-
ful death statute limits recovery to pecuniary losses, and therefore 
allowing a jury to attempt to estimate such losses in this type of case 
would result in speculation. Statutes limiting recovery for wrongful 
death to pecuniary loss are known as compensatory statutes and are to 
be contrasted with noncompensatory statutes,55 which are discussed 
infra. 
Even among those states with a compensatory wrongfui death statute, 
the majority allow recovery regardless of the threat of speculative 
damage.56 Among the minority that do not allow recovery, the threat 
of speculative damages is still one of the primary arguments on which 
denial is based. In a North Carolina case,57 the court n:sted its denial 
of recovery for a stillborn viable fetus on the fact that the North 
Carolina wrongful death statute limits recovery to " 'such damages as 
are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting 
from such death.' "58 The court held that "[i]n the case of prenatal 
death there is no competent means of measuring the probable future 
earnings of the foetus.''59 
52 Polson, Essentials of Forensic Medicine 440 (2d rev. ed. 1965). 
53 Hall v. Hancock, !12 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834). 
54 G.L., c. 272, §19. 
55 McCormick, Damages §10!1 (19!15). 
56See note 12 supra; White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 5!17, 458 P.2d 617, 62!1 (1969). 
Consider also that two states, commonly cited as not allowing :1 wrongful death 
action for a stillborn viable fetus, deny it because of a peculiar statute that pre-
dicates the action on the death of minor persons. Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 21!1 
So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954). 
57 Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. !194, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). 
58 Id. at !198, 146 S.E.2d at 428. 
119 Ibid. See also majority opinion and cases cited therein; End.resz v. Friedberg, 
24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 90!1 (1969). 
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In a recent Michigan case,6o the majority based the denial of 
recovery for a stillborn viable fetus on the interpretation of the word 
person in Michigan's compensatory death statute. 61 However, a con-
curring opinion concluded that denial should have been based upon 
the failure of the complaint to allege a pecuninary loss within the 
meaning of the statute.62 This opinion not only rejected the assertion 
of damages resulting from loss of monetary contributions of the child; 
it also attacked, as debasing, the idea of attempting to recover for 
deprivation of the mutual society and companionship of the child: 
"In a humane and civilized culture, such a thing is not a pecuniary 
loss."63 
Conversely, in other recent decisions involving wrongful death 
statutes that permit nonpecuniary losses, courts have allowed recovery 
for a stillborn viable fetus. The Nevada Supreme Court, in allowing 
such a recovery, held that the speculative damage argument is not a 
problem in Nevada: "Decisive ... is the fact that the Nevada Wrong-
ful Death Statute, along with the statutes of numerous other states, 
specifically provides that such elements of nonpecuniary loss may be 
recovered."64 In reply to the argument that placing a monetary value 
upon the loss of companionship is debasing, the court stated that this 
is no different than when the injured fetus survives birth and then 
dies: "It is no less a loss to the survivors where, as here, the child died 
before birth; and it is clear that the Legislature intended that what-
ever loss there is should be compensated."65 
A similar result was reached in a federal district court applying 
the law of West Virginia.66 The West Virginia wrongful death 
statute67 provides that a recovery not exceeding $10,000 may be had for 
nonpecuniary losses, but any sum greater must depend on pecuniary 
loss. The court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a claim 
for damages for the wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus, stated 
that such an action could be maintained "but with such damages 
limited to $10,000.00 for sorrow, distress and bereavement only."68 
These decisions, which involve a noncompensatory type of wrongful 
death statute, would be particularly noteworthy precedents for the 
Massachusetts courts since the Massachusetts wrongful death statute69 
is also noncompensatory. The statute dictates that the amount of 
60 Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (1968). 
61 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §27A.2922, as amended by Public Acts No. 146 (1965). 
62 380 Mich. 160, 176, 156 N.W.2d 530, 535 (1968). 
63 Id. at 173, 156 N.W.2d at 534. But see Lambert, Comments on Recent Impor-
tant Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 18 NACCA L.J. 378 (1956). 
64 White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 537, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (1969). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969). 
67 W. Va. Code Ann. §55-7-5 (1966). 
68 295 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D.W. Va. 1969). 
69 See note 3 supra. 
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damage in the case of wrongful death is to be assessed with reference 
to the defendant's degree of culpability. It has been argued that since 
the statute is punitive, "[s]peculation as to damages ... should not be 
used as an argument against allowing recovery by a child stillborn or 
by one who dies immediately after birth."7° It has also been suggested 
that the only instance in which the punitive death statute gives a more 
sensible result than a compensatory statute is where the death of a 
child is involved, since there is no need to attempt to ascertain the 
amount of pecuniary loss.71 The logic of that suggestion could be 
extended to the recovery for the death of a stillborn viable fetus. Then 
the court would not have to face the difficult issue of ascertaining 
pecuniary loss, since the amount of damage depends only on the 
extent of the defendant's culpability. 
In summary, it may be said that the trend among the states is to 
allow recovery for the stillbirth of a viable fetus. This trend is even 
more pronounced in states that have a death statute which allows for 
nonpecuniary damages. Allowing recovery for the death of a viable 
fetus seems a more reasonable rule than limiting the cause of action 
to those who survive birth, although both limitations have degrees 
of illogicalness and problems of proof. 
The ideal solution to the problem would be legislative pronounce-
ment.72 However, since all wrongful death statutes are likely to remain 
silent on the question, courts will continue to decide the issue by 
balancing elements of public policy, legislative standardization and 
scientific revelations. It is submitted that it would be the better result 
for Massachusetts courts to join the majority of courts which have 
decided the issue, by allowing recovery for the sti1lbirth of a viable 
fetus. Allowing recovery seems the most reasonable and equitable 
solution in light of all pertinent considerations. 
RoBERT L. LEONARD 
70 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.10 at 46. Cf. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowl-
edge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 556 n.l8 
(1962), where it is suggested that the punitive nature of the Massachusetts statute 
compels the courts to allow recovery for prenatal death. 
71 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.6 at 86. 
72 Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, I Harv. J. Legis. !!8, 34-35 (1964), 
recommends specific legislation allowing recovery of a limited amount of money for 
the death of a stillborn viable fetus, due to the speculative nature of damages. 
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